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ABSTRACT
PRESSURE, IDEOLOGY, STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
DARREN G. SPIELMAN, B.A., WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert S. Feldman
In this dissertation, I present and test a theory of corporate responsibility. The
theory predicts that corporations with “social and economic” ideologies (as opposed to
“economic” ideologies) and “people-centered” human resource practices should behave
more responsibly toward the outside world. I assessed ideology from annual reports and
human resource practices from a survey mailed to the top human resource executive at
65 1 large, publicly traded corporations. Independent ratings of the social records of
corporations provided measures of company behavior. The study controlled for industry,
financial status, and size of company. Results provide some support for the theory.
Above and beyond control variables, the additive effects of ideology and human resource
practices predicted corporate responsibility. Ideology independently predicted company
behavior.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Through their enormous reach and resources, large corporations affect the
lives of billions. They touch employees, consumers, communities, governments,
environments, investors, and other businesses. Despite their awesome impact, and the
apparent relevance of much social psychological theory to their behavior, social
psychologists have largely ignored the business corporation (with some notable
exceptions, see Messick & Tenbrusel, 1996).
A comprehensive understanding of corporate social responsibility requires
many levels of analysis, from the historical and societal to the organizational,
interpersonal, personal and cognitive. My work offers little explicit historical and
societal analysis. It focuses on internal elements of organizations and the
psychological pressures and processes that result. While not nearly comprehensive,
this approach should yield important insights into corporate social responsibility. It
should lay one brick on the path towards a social psychology of corporate behavior.
Expanding on the work of Box (1983) and Kramer (1983), irresponsible
corporate behavior is defined here as:
Acts of commission or omission by an individual or group of
individuals in a corporation, in accordance with the operative goals of
the organization, that inflict serious physical, psychological, or
unethical economic harm on employees, consumers, other
organizations, specific segments of the general public, the general
public, or the environment.
Responsible corporate behavior is defined as:
Acts of commission or omission by an individual or group of
individuals in a corporation that -- beyond providing expected benefits
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Gobs, products, services etc.) - produce unusual physical,
psychological or economic well-being for employees, consumers, other
organizations, specific segments of the general public, the general
public, and the environment.
To an extent, the corporate condition promotes problem behavior. This is true
because (among other important reasons): 1) corporations, regardless of industry,
wealth, size, or market share, pursue infinitely receding goals - primarily profit
maximization, 2) elements inherent in complex organizations (such as those that
detach people from responsibility for their actions and from the external consequences
of their actions) facilitate unethical, harmful behavior and suppress ethical,
responsible behavior. The interaction of constant profit pressure and structural
facilitation poises corporations on the edge of an ethical precipice. Most jump. Many
do so frequently (e.g. Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Sutherland, 1949; U.S. Senate, 1992).
The results are costly, dangerous, destructive and, often, deadly.
For example, even a conservative estimate places the number of deaths and
serious injuries yearly due to corporate harmdoing far above the numbers due to
conventional crime. Industrial accidents kill roughly 14,000 workers and permanently
disable 390,000 workers in the USA each year (some researchers estimate that 45% of
accidents result from violations of safety regulations) (Coleman, 1989; McMullan,
1992). Diseases caused by the work people do or did kill 50,000 to 100,000 per year
(the majority of which many researchers attribute to negligence or willful disregard of
safety and health regulations) (Winslow, 1990; Reiman, 1984), and hazardous goods
and products kill 30,000 and permanently disable another 100,000 (Ellis, 1986;
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Schrager & Short, 1978; Simon & Eitzen, 1986). In contrast, traditional murders and
manslaughters in the U.S. take roughly 20,000 lives per year (McMullan, 1992)
Similarly, corporate crimes of capital deprive people of far more money than
conventional economic crimes, such as robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft
(Poveda, 1994; McMullan, 1992). The total property loss from conventional crime,
as estimated from the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, was five billion
dollars in 1990 (Poveda, 1994). For the same year, a fair estimate of various crimes
of capital (excluding crimes against worker safety and the environment) rests around
$50 billion. Estimates that include faulty goods and monopolistic practices along
with other corporate economic violations place the cost between $174 and $231
billion (McMullan, 1992). Although scholars cannot precisely asses its impact, such
corporate behavior clearly does tremendous harm to society.
However, corporations also do tremendous good. They provide jobs, wealth
and, often, useful services and products. Despite profit pressure and structural
hurdles, many corporations, in many ways, behave responsibly. They produce safe
products and services, provide decent dignified working conditions, minimize
environmental impact, follow trade and financial regulations and even interact
productively and philanthropically with communities and non-profit organizations.
For example, corporations spend over 8 billion philanthropic dollars every
year (AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy, 1997). These dollars fund many nonprofit
pursuits, including community development organizations, cultural and educational
organizations, and health and human service providers. Corporations and banks
together provide 15% of the total unearned income of community development
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organizations (America, 1995). While such giving could be more substantial and
strategic, it has helped communities clime out of chronic economic distress and
created large numbers ofjobs and housing units. In 1967, when such investment
began, 160 health and insurance companies formed the Urban Investment Company.
Across a five year period, this program created over 100,000 housing units and 60,000
jobs (America, 1995). The Ford Foundation (1990) estimates that between 1970 and
1990 corporations, insurance companies and community foundations invested $2
billion in community development.
Although corporations are poised to behave in illegitimate, irresponsible and
harmful ways, they can behave responsibly and helpfully (and turn a profit, too).
What separates irresponsible, harmful corporations from the responsible and helpful?
(Obviously, dichotomous categorization does not make sense here. Many
corporations are responsible and ethical in some ways, and irresponsible and unethical
in others. Firms can be both highly helpful and highly harmful. There are many
specific ways to help and to harm. The current work recognizes, and to some extent
addresses, specific forms of behavior. However, for the most part, it focuses on
responsibility and irresponsibility generally, and assumes that corporations can
meaningfully vary in this way.) The partial theory presented here suggests, not only
that pressure to meet infinitely receding goals promotes problem behavior, but that
different orientations to goals can create more or less responsible corporations. It
suggests, not only that the structure of large corporations creates trouble, but that
different structures and practices can promote more or less responsibility.
Pressure
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Business corporations exist in a state of strain. They pursue an infinitely
receding goal - profit maximization. (This is not meant to be a comprehensive
explanation of corporate motivation. Rather, it is a simplification meant to
summarily, but meaningfully represent part of the corporate state. Other goals, such
as growth, stability, power and prestige are widely assumed to stem from the profit
motive.) There is no end; the target moves. Small goals met are renewed (Passas,
1990; Vaughn, 1983). Constant pressure primes the firm for irresponsible behavior.
The model presented here regards this pressure as internal, and distinct from
the pressure of scarcity and other unique external pressures (such as poor financial
performance and heightened competition). Scarcity does significantly predict
corporate violations of laws and regulations. For example, aggregating over a five
year period, Fortune 500 companies that violated anti-trust laws had significantly
poorer financial performance than non-violators (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975).
Evidence suggests that poor financial performance precedes violations (and not vice
versa). While it is possible that poorer corporations are merely more likely to get
caught, this is an unlikely explanation for results obtained from the study of Fortune
500 companies (Jamieson, 1994).
Scarcity, however, does not account for a large portion of the variance in
corporate violations. Among large firms, size, growth-rate, and financial success
together do not provide a good prediction of illegal behavior (Clinard & Yeager,
1980). The current model proposes that profit pressure within corporations is already
so high that unique external pressure exacerbates, but is not necessary to explain (and,
empirically, does not adequately predict) corporate irresponsibility (Passas, 1990;
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Vaughn, 1983). Some researchers have isolated profit maximization as the “single
most compelling factor behind deviance in industry whether it be price-fixing, the
destruction of competition, or the misrepresentation of a product.” (McCaghy, 1976).
Passas (1990) incorporates profit pressure into his explanation of corporate
deviance by applying Merton’ s (1968) theory of “anomie” to the business
corporation. Within the corporation, people are highly committed to the profit goal
(after all, the corporation must produce profit to survive). Furthermore, the goal, both
within corporations and within the majority of our cultures, is legitimate and highly
valued. However, legitimate and responsible means to meet organizational goals are
often limited (and less clearly dictated by cultural norms). While the proper goal is
clear, proper means to meet it are not. From this environment, innovative solutions
arise. Some solutions are legitimate and responsible; other are not. Under great
pressure and the guise (or feeling) of legitimate pursuit, the line between responsible
and irresponsible behavior blurs. At some point, people in the firm cross the line.
They undertake illegitimate, irresponsible behaviors. To the extent that those in the
firm perceive these behaviors as effective, they become accepted and normative. The
line between illegitimate and legitimate behavior shifts; the organization and the
individuals in it move from their previous moral location.
In this manner, harmful practices can become part of normal business
procedure. They are taken for granted. For example, a General Electric official
convicted for price-fixing stated that price fixing “had become so common and gone
on for so many years that we lost sight of the fact that it was illegal (Geis, 1978 — as
cited in McMullan, 1992).
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More trouble arises as intense profit pressure, and its acceptance as a purely
legitimate goal, narrows people’s focus on financial outcomes, excluding other factors
from the decision making process. An outcome-centered morality reigns,
marginalizing concerns for the means used to meet goals. This cannot only press
people towards illegitimate, harmful behaviors, but can short circuit thinking around
active, prosocial engagement with the world. For example, in a study of Fortune 500
companies, top managers typically expressed the feeling that, when pursuing the
economic well-being of the company they had no right to wrap themselves “in the
mantle of moral philosophers and judges.” The economic survival of the corporation
“sometimes dictated that they violate the law, if they did not, their stockholders would
suffer.” (Silk & Vogel, 1976). Yeager (1995) found that communication about ethical
matters is limited in typical corporate bureaucracies. Ethical issues are sublimated,
organizationally and personally. In an interview study of large corporations,
managers indicated that “ethical dilemmas were not publicly discussible as matters of
implicit corporate policy.” (Yeager, 1995).
In Clinard’s (1983) study of retired middle managers from Fortune 500
companies, 90.6 % of those interviewed said that pressures to show profit, keep costs
down, meet production and sales quotas, and the associated time-pressures, lead to
unethical corporate behavior. The American Management Association found that the
majority of 3,000 executives studied “felt under pressure to compromise personal
standards to meet company goals” (Lufthans & Hodgetts, 1976). Fortune 500
executives in marketing, finance and production — surveyed by Lincoln, Pressley and
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Little (1982) -- overwhelmingly admitted to compromising personal values in pursuit
of organizational goals.
The time constraints associated with profit pressure, as mentioned by the
managers in Clinard’s (1983) study, exacerbate tendencies towards irresponsible
behavior. Time pressure further elevates intolerance for deliberation over concerns
other than profit-centered concerns. It can lead individuals to miss, ignore or fail to
synthesize evidence of problems or danger (Darley, 1992). As individuals become
hurried and overworked, they become less able to focus on other than their “primary
task.” They become less likely to notice and take account of the impact of their
actions on others (Trevino, 1986). Anything that might disrupt progress towards the
corporate goal tends to fall out of the equation.
Corporate ideology
It seems that profit pressure poises corporations to behave harmfully.
However, the current model suggests that different orientations to the profit goal, and
different conceptions of the organization generally, can exacerbate or mitigate the
harmful effects of constant goal-pressure. They can help push corporations towards
the illegitimate, unethical and harmful or towards the legitimate and ethical, and even
towards becoming positive actors in society.
I argue here that, given the pressures under which corporations operate, (and
the cultural legitimization of business behavior) corporations with economic
ideologies (i.e. ideologies that define the corporation as an economic institution
whose responsibility is to produce surplus profit for shareholders, cf. Friedman, 1962)
will be less responsible than corporations with social and economic ideologies (i.e.
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ideologies that view the corporation as a social as well as an economic institution,
embedded in a larger social context and responsible to the individuals, groups and
entities that may affect or be affected by the organization cf. Freeman, 1984; Cohen,
1995a). The current model proposes that corporations with economic ideologies are
not only more likely to ignore other concerns in the “amoral” pursuit of profit, but that
they are more likely to shift from “amoral” profit-maximization to “immoral” active
violation of laws and external notions of responsibility.
Before discussing the effects of different ideologies on corporate behavior, it
seems necessary to establish that corporations can have meaningfully uniform
ideologies. Corporate ideology, here, refers to a set of beliefs or norms concerning
the establishment of responsibilities, goals and intentions, the consideration of
consequences and the implementation of procedures in a corporation. It is (currently
considered to be) contained in and communicated through individuals, such as top
executives and company founders, explicit documents such as mission statements,
philosophies, codes of conduct, and firm histories, and implicit communications such
as firm mythology and informal history. Of course, employee perceptions of these
elements importantly shape the influence and existence of ideology (Cohen, 1995a).
The notion of a company-consistent ideology is somewhat problematic. Study
of corporate moral climate ~ a closely related construct - suggests that ideology
should not be completely consistent throughout an organization. Larger firms tend to
have less consistent climates. Degree of product and geographic diversification, as
well as other strategic factors, also affect consistency (Victor & Cullen, 1988).
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However, high levels of consistency are possible, given deeply ingrained standards of
corporate conduct (Cohen, 1995a).
Furthermore, the current model requires meaningfully uniform ideology. If
ideology affects the behavior of corporations and the individuals in them, it seems
reasonable to regard it as meaningful. Ample evidence exists that ideology, as
defined here, affects behavior. Recent studies of business misconduct have identified
organizational goal-setting norms as a key determinant of whether or not employees
will engage in unethical and criminal business practices (Passas, 1990). Logdson and
Yuthas (1997) found that the primary force determining the “level of moral
development” within a corporation is the set of ethical expectations held by top
management. They argue that top managers set the moral tone of an organization and
filter their philosophy through all levels of the organization. Cohen (1995a) argues
similarly that the beliefs and behavior of senior executives play an especially
important role in setting the moral tone of the firm. The middle managers from
Fortune 500 companies in Clinard’s (1983) study cited the ethics and goals of top
management as the number one influence on ethical and unethical corporate behavior.
The managers also cited the ethical history of the corporation as an important factor.
Over 90% of corporate managers interviewed agreed that employee attitudes towards
government regulation, legal violations, communication of ethical problems, and the
enforcement of conduct codes “directly mirrored executive beliefs” (Clinard, 1983).
In field studies of workplace ethics and corporate crime, the salient role of top
managers as moral models is continually reinforced (e.g. Arlow & Ulrich, 1985;
Brenner & Molander, 1977; Passas, 1990).
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Further, evidence exists linking economic ideologies to irresponsible, harmful
behaviors. Clinard and Yeager’s (1980) research suggests that corporations that
emphasize profits above other concerns and that disavow responsibility to
community, consumer, or society tend to have difficulty following legal norms.
Hosmer (1994) found that the narrow pursuit of a single goal can cause a wide range
of harms to multiple organizational constituents. Several studies have found high
rates of misconduct in organizations whose goal-setting norms overemphasize goal
attainment and underemphasize the following of legitimate procedures to attain
organizational goals (e.g. Braithwhite, 1989; Cohen, 1994b).
The current theory suggests that economic ideologies exacerbate the harmful
and irresponsible tendencies inherent in the corporate state. Corporations with such
ideologies are explicitly ends-oriented. In the absence of moral or legal constraints,
they tend to respect workers, consumers, communities, environments and
governments only to the extent that such respect serves their own goals. They restrict
concerns of “ordinary” morality in decision-making, regarding them as a source of
inefficiency. They justify such restrictions by reference to the social goods produced
by the pursuit of profit and wealth in the market (Yeager, 1995; Friedman, 1962).
Social-economic ideologies should mitigate these tendencies, providing a
countervailing force at every point.
Economic ideologies do not explicitly condone harmful behavior. However, a
strong belief in the primacy of the economic mission -- to the exclusion of other
concerns - should makes firms less likely to collect, synthesize, weight, or interpret as
meaningful, information about potential harms and violations (e.g. Cohen, 1994b;
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Passas, 1990). Since they do not easily regard information about potential harm as
relevant, the potential for harm must cross a much higher threshold before decision-
makers include it in their equation. This simple process shifts the corporate pay-off
matrix towards the irresponsible. It should also make firms far more likely to select
irresponsible innovative solutions from the anomic state described in the previous
section (Passas, 1990).
Factors such as these, that further blur the line between the legitimate and
illegitimate, or that obscure initial signals of harm, are particularly insidious given
theories about the step by step manner in which people come to destructive or evil
actions. Researchers of evil have persuasively argued that people approach
harmdoing by taking small steps along a continuum, with each step so small as to be
continuous with the previous. After each step they are positioned to the take next. In
this manner, people can come to perpetrate extreme harm (Staub, 1989; Darley,
1992). Here, they can do so while still framing their actions as “amoral” market
behavior.
The ability to justify harmful acts by linking them to higher purposes also
enables people to perpetrate great harm without feeling morally culpable (Bandura,
Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996). Thus, the strong, near-spiritual belief in the
ascendancy of the market that characterizes many firms with economic ideologies
serves to validate a great range of irresponsible and harmful behaviors (Yeager,
1995). It should also facilitate the “splitting of self’ that many authors discuss in
relation to harm within organizational settings (e.g. Lifton, 1986; Baumhart, 1968).
People’s capacity to create “compartmentalized selves,” such as a “private, moral
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self’ (that lives by a set of internal values, morals, and standards) and a “corporate
self’ (that does what the job “requires,” regardless) allows them to perpetrate or
contribute to harmful acts without feeling morally responsible for them and without
loosing one’s self-concept as a good, moral person (Litton, 1986). A powerful,
justifying corporate ideology fuels this process - explicitly and persuasively defining
and legitimizing a “corporate self.”
However, these “separate selves” cannot always avoid conflict. Often,
managers and employees face conscious collision between personal and corporate
values (e.g. Sutherland, 1949; Welch, 1994). In these situations, economic ideology
serves another important function. By focusing on business concerns, ideology helps
individuals frame these collisions as conflicts between professional values and
organizational requirements. They need not view conflicts in personal moral terms.
Violating professional ethics presents problems for the individual, but does not
implicate the self as basically bad (Yeager, 1995).
Economic ideology may further promote irresponsible behavior by facilitating
the devaluation of potential victims of the corporation (Hills, 1987). Researchers
have documented a tendency for people, not only to harm those whom they devalue,
but to devalue (or further devalue) those whom they harm (Staub, 1989). The
economic ideology explicitly directs those in the firm to concern themselves foremost
with the shareholder (and themselves) through the production of profit, excluding
other concerns.
Excluding people from moral concern pushes them to the perimeter of one’s
moral sphere. One’s moral sphere is the range of people who one considers fully
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human and, therefore, deserving of “human” treatment. Different people, and groups
of people, rest at different depths of one’s sphere. The closer to the center, the more
deserving of moral consideration. People or groups who rest at the periphery, or
completely outside, of one’s sphere do not warrant such consideration. They are
devalued. One can treat them poorly without violating one’s sense of self as a just,
good person (Staub, 1989). The economic ideology primes people in the firm to
exclude consumers, workers and others and view them as deserving of the fate that
befalls them.
The notion that people deserve what befalls them is central to an economic
ideology. The belief system assumes that the market justly distributes rewards and
punishments to its participants. Such a belief exacerbates the apparent tendency of
people to believe that others get what they deserve and deserve what they get. This
tendency -- known as the “just-world” phenomenon -- leads people to assume that
victims have earned their suffering by their actions or character (Lemer, 1980).
Armed with this assumption, decision-makers in the corporation can blame and
devalue laborers and consumers that are victimized by the corporation. Thus,
officials at Robins 1 could attribute harm from the use of the Dalcon Shield to
improper insertion of the device or to the lifestyles of “promiscuous women.”
Asbestos workers who develop lung cancer can be dismissed because they “smoke too
much and are predisposed to die from cancer anyway, ‘so why blame us?”’ (Hills,
1987).
'The firm that distributed the Dalcon Shield.
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In contrast, a social-economic view of the corporation should mitigate the
harmful tendencies of the corporate state and make the corporation more likely to
become a positive actor in society. Social-economic ideologies view the corporation
as embedded in and responsible for a larger social context. They hold the corporation
accountable to all stakeholders (that is, all individuals, groups and entities that can
affect or be effected by the corporation cf. Freeman, 1984). Cohen (1995a) suggests
that positive moral climate ensues when executives seek to integrate concerns of
multiple stakeholders in the formulation of organizational strategy.
Social-economic ideologies move “ordinary moral” concerns from the margin
to the middle. They support the pursuit of profit, but do not use it as a transcendent
goal to justify irresponsible means of pursuit. This should make firms more likely to
collect, synthesize, weight, and interpret as meaningful, information about potential
harms and violations. Potential for harm need cross a much lower threshold to be
included by decision-makers in their equation. This shifts the corporate pay-off
matrix towards the responsible.
By embedding the corporation in the community, instead of viewing it as an
independent, autonomous economic unit, and by beholding it to multiple external
stakeholders, a social-economic ideology should bring the “corporate self’ and
“private self’ together. It should more closely align their goals and values. The
reduction of this split should limit the ability of those in the firm to comfortably
perpetrate harm. It should help implicate the private selfwhen conflict arises.
Further, by valuing all stakeholders, social-economic ideology explicitly denounces
dehumanization. It attempts to draw the moral sphere as inclusively as possible.
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Obviously, the two ideologies presented here are ideals. Few corporations are
pure examples of either. Most should fall somewhere in between. The present theory
predicts that corporations closer to the social-economic ideal will be more responsible
- both less likely to harm and more likely to help others - than those closer to the
economic ideal.
Structure
Along with profit pressure, the model suggests that structural and procedural
elements inherent - or highly common ~ in complex organizations poise corporations
to behave irresponsibly. Crucially, as corporations become complex, they tend to
develop an extensive division of specialized tasks, teams and departments
(McMullan, 1992; Hills, 1987). Researchers assume that such structure creates
diffusion of responsibility. That is, no single department of an organization, let alone
a single person, feels responsible for the overall outcome of the corporation’s work.
Each person works on a small part of a small puzzle. All of the puzzles together
comprise the organization’s output. This situation, although necessary for the
functioning of the firm, diffuses personal responsibility for almost every type of
decision and action, from those that are inconsequential to those that impact the lives
of thousands (e.g. Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Darley, 1996).
One might argue that top executives should have a broad, holistic view of the
corporation, and that, therefore, they should not demonstrate the diffusion of
responsibility characteristic of other employees. However, top executives are often
divorced from details of operation. Frequently, executives issue strong directives to
meet specific goals, but then never learn the details ofhow those goals are met. They
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retain a “right not to know.” Indeed, Brenner and Molander (1977) reported that 50%
of employees interviewed from large companies felt that their superiors did not want
to know how they met goals, so long as the goals were met. Whether intentionally
insulated or merely ignorant, disconnection from the process through which
employees follow orders creates distance between executives and outcomes and frees
them from feelings (and the legal liability) of personal responsibility (Hills, 1987).
Thus, while the process is somewhat different than diffusion, the result is the same.
Another related, but distinct phenomenon I label here “abdication of
responsibility.” When working in organizational contexts - especially ones in which
individuals are supposed to carry out orders, such as most corporations — people less
frequently check behaviors against their internal standards. When they open
themselves to regulation by others, individuals have a harder time viewing themselves
as responsible for their own actions. They define themselves more as instruments for
carrying out the wishes of others. Thus, they abdicate personal responsibility
(Milgram, 1974; Trevino, 1986). This is particularly insidious when top management
issues strong commands to meet goals (e.g. “no matter what”) and then turns its back
on the process. Middle managers may then make irresponsible or harmful decisions,
feeling that they are following instructions from their superiors — free of personal
responsibility. Top management, meanwhile, feels it made no irresponsible or
harmful demand (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Darley, 1996).
People working in large corporations tend to have great psychological distance
from potential victims or beneficiaries of their behavior. The more highly placed the
employee or executive, the greater this distance tends to be (Yeager, 1995). The
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ability to sense the potential harm in one’s actions is diffuse, distant and weak.
Potential victims are abstract. They are not salient. They are numbers on a page.
They are miles and months or years away. They will never be encountered. Many of
the forces that cause people to avoid harming others rely on the salient presence of
specific or specifically imagined victims (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Some
researchers propose that, for personal moral norms to be activated and influence
behavior, individuals must be aware of the consequences of their actions on others
(Trevino, 1986). Sociologists regard distance between the potential “criminal mind”
and the potential “criminal act” as a “criminogenic situation” (that is, a situation that
generates crime) (Gross, 1978a; Jackal, 1980).
The distant, abstract nature of potential victims becomes more severe when
contrasted with the salience and immediacy of business and career contingencies.
Potential gains, both for career and corporation, are tangible. As discussed earlier,
pressure to obtain these gains is extreme. For individuals in most corporations there
is intense personal pressure to show profit, keep costs down and meet production
and/or sales quotas — in a tight time frame. Failure to meet marks jeopardizes jobs
and careers. Thus, individuals must balance the immediate fear ofjob loss or career
death (and the needs of those dependent on them) with concern for the shadows of
potential harm. In this situation, shadows do not do well (Hills, 1987).
Information about potential harm must clear another hurdle before it can
influence corporate behavior. As discussed earlier, corporations do not typically deal
well with information about potential danger or harm. It was suggested that ideology
could mitigate or exacerbate this tendency by making such information more or less
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relevant. Corporate structure plays an important role here as well (of course, structure
and ideology are not independent. One can drive the other). Corporations commonly
collect, synthesize and rigorously process information about sales, markets, profits
etc. In contrast, information about potential harm is abnormal. It tends to remain
fragmented, pieces resting in different divisions of the corporation. Good
mechanisms to synthesize and report the information typically do not exist. By the
time information comes together, or comes to the attention of decision-makers, they
have often already committed to a course of action (Darley, 1996).
People, in general, resist withdrawing from courses of action once they have
committed to them, even when a course appears unsound (Staw & Ross, 1987). As
Darley (1996) observes, the organizational context strengthens this resistance. After
individuals advocate for a course of action, their status within the corporation is at
risk. After the corporation accepts the action, it commits both resources and
reputation. Turning around means losing money and losing face. At this point,
businesses are extremely unlikely to change course. When they do consider turning
back after such commitment, those advocating for the change often must prove that
the current course will create harm. This reverses the typical calculation, which
requires proof of safety. For such reversed calculations, many have suffered (Darley,
1996).
Human Resource Practices
Although typical structural and procedural elements poise corporations to
behave irresponsibly, the current model proposes that different structures and
practices can mitigate the problem. The model points to a suite of people-centered
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(Pfeffer, 1998) human resource practices that, when implemented in concert, should:
1) lead to or raise internalization of and commitment to the corporate mission, 2) lead
to or raise feelings of responsibility for the behavior and outcomes of and for the
corporation - decreasing diffusion and abdication of responsibility and making
people feel more connected to and responsible for the whole, 3) mitigate elements of
career pressure and fear ofjob loss that can enhance the pressure to make or go along
with harmful decisions, 4) increase willingness to gather and share information about
potential trouble, harm, or danger and 5) enhance the ability to break from committed
courses of action, once they have been identified as irresponsible. These practices,
particularly when coupled with a social-economic ideology, should promote
responsible corporate behavior.
First among these practices is employee ownership. When employees up and
down the corporate ranks have an ownership stake in the firm (e.g. stock ownership,
profit-sharing), a majority of the corporation can come to feel committed to and
responsible for the corporation. It is important to note that employee ownership by
itself, without a culture of ownership in which employees take on new rights and
responsibilities, has little effect on organizational behavior (Jacobson, 1996).
However, if a culture of ownership does exist, the potential effects on responsibility
seem great.
For example, it was mentioned earlier that top management might not diffuse
personal responsibility because of their holistic view of the firm. It was then noted
that top management’s distance from the details of firm operation disrupts (or allows
denial of) feelings of responsibility. A culture of employee ownership increases the
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holistic firm view of employees in general (Jacobson, 1996). Yet, employees remain
intimate with the details of operation. Such a combination should increase feelings of
personal responsibility throughout the firm and, thus, should increase responsible
behavior.
Social psychologists, among other social scientists, have studied the
phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility for years (Darley & Latane’, 1968; Clinard
& Yeager, 1980; Darley, 1996). It has been widely cited as a problem in complex
organizational contexts. That is, no single department of an organization, let alone a
single person, feels responsible for the overall outcome of the corporation’s work.
Each person works on a small part of a small puzzle. All of the puzzles together
comprise the organization’s output. This situation, although necessary for the
functioning of the firm, arguably diffuses personal responsibility for almost every type
of decision and action (e.g. Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Darley, 1996; Hills, 1987).
Social psychologists have found that in situations conducive to responsibility
diffusion, mechanisms that focus feelings of responsibility on individuals can
counteract diffusion and help people act responsibly (Staub, 1991). An employee
ownership culture should be such a mechanism. Such ownership creates feelings of
responsibility for the organization. Employees should feel that the company, in part,
is theirs and, therefore, they are responsible for its outcomes (Jacobson, 1996).
Reduction of status differences - the flattening of hierarchies -- is another
important piece of the puzzle. Such reduction (through, for example, reduction of
wage and privilege inequality, creation ofcommon eating and socializing spaces)
shows concern for all members of the organization and allows all employees to feel
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valued (Pfeffer, 1998). It helps create feelings of connection to the system as a whole
and feelings of positive connection to others in the organization (Cohen, 1995a)
These feelings - under the labels of “embeddedness” and “bonding” - are two central
elements of “social integration,” which has been consistently identified as a powerful
psychological constraint on unethical, antisocial and criminal corporate behavior (e.g.
Braithwhite, 1989; Cohen, 1992a).
Jacobson (1996) also identifies flattening of hierarchies as an important
element of “employee ownership culture.” Again, it fights diffusion of responsibility,
giving people a stake in the organization and, therefore, allowing them to feel
responsible for its outcomes. Flatter hierarchies also make it less likely that
authorities will be able to act without the consent of those under them. They make it
more likely that opposing voices will rise; they facilitate the voicing of constructive,
critical ideas (Staub, 1997). This can help halt harmful decisions from being made.
The effect becomes particularly strong when people feel both personally responsible
for the behavior of the corporation and empowered to speak out (Staub, 1997).
The institution of democratic decision-making practices also plays an
important role. Broadening decision making power increases employees feelings of
accountability and responsibility for their organization’s behavior (Pfeffer, 1998).
They become agents, instead of instruments for carrying out the wishes of others.
This is important because it makes them more likely to check their decisions and
behaviors against personal standards, working against abdication of responsibility
(Milgram, 1974; Trevino, 1986). Checking against personal standards increases the
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likelihood that people will view irresponsible or harmful actions as such and,
therefore, reject or speak up against them (Milgram, 1974; Trevino, 1986).
Together with reduction of status differences, decision-making power should
increase employees’ ability to challenge management when they witness misconduct
or potentially irresponsible decisions of superiors or equals (Cohen, 1992a). Studies
indicate employee empowerment and organizational democracy reduce alienation,
increase self-efficacy and encourage a sense of ownership for the consequences of
actions (e.g. Kanungo, 1992; Kanter, 1979). Again, a heightened feeling of
responsibility for the organization along with a heightened capacity to air critical
opinions can reduce the likelihood that harmful decisions will be made and acted on
(Staub, 1997).
Furthermore, including lower levels of employees in the decision-making
process should more closely align corporate concerns with the potential targets of
corporate behavior. As previously mentioned, Yeager (1995) has found that top
management tends to focus on outcome-centered, utilitarian concerns while middle
and lower management tend to increasingly focus on action- or means- centered
concerns. Top management tends to express no conflict between corporate policy and
ethics or personal morality. Middle and lower management tend to express conflict
between policy and professional ethics and between policy and personal morality.
Yeager argues that people tend to have more concern for those with whom they have
most contact and feel least psychological distance. Thus, managers overseeing the
work of colleagues and relations with customers and others outside the firm are more
likely to consider the needs of these groups. When such managers have significant
23
decision-making power, the corporation’s behavior should reflect concern for
multiple internal and external stakeholders (Cohen, 1 995a).
The sharing of information (including financial, performance, strategic and
operational information) is another critical practice. Sharing information shows trust
in employees, which should further increase feelings of connection to and
responsibility for the firm and its behaviors (Pfeffer, 1998). Without broad
information distribution, democratic decision-making will not work and status
differences will resist reduction. As already mentioned, these elements are important
to increase employees’ feelings of personal responsibility for their organization, to
increase the likelihood that alternative voices will be heard in the decision making
process, and to increase the likelihood that employees will check behaviors and
decisions against internal standards.
Access to information is regarded as essential for equitable power distribution,
for increasing social integration and institutional involvement and for reducing
feelings of powerlessness that lead to detachment (Ashforth, 1988; Kelman &
Hamilton, 1989). Detachment can make it easier to generate and go along with
harmful courses of action (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989).
Employment security can also contribute to corporate responsibility
2
. A
feeling of security can build trust, cooperation and partnership within the
organization. This, again, should contribute to feelings of personal commitment and
responsibility for the outcomes of the organization (Kelleher, 1997). It
2Common business sense to the contrary, employment security is empirically associated with
firm financial success. Furthermore, employment security appears to generate
financial success. Not
vice versa (Locke, 1995).
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simultaneously encourages employees to have a longer-term view of their jobs and of
company performance (Delery & Doty, 1996). This is significant because harmful,
irresponsible decisions are often associated with short-term thinking, while
responsible decisions are associated with long-term perspectives (Cohen, 1995a).
Furthermore, individuals who are secure in their jobs are more likely to speak up
against practices that they perceive as improper. They are less likely to make
irresponsible, harmful decisions for the sake of securing their own job. The slight
alleviation of this typically intense pressure can go a long way towards increasing
corporate responsibility.
Many psychologists (e.g. Staub, 1989) argue that psychological security is a
basic human need. Researchers suggest that when needs are frustrated, people will
work to satisfy them. Often, need frustration leads to destructive modes of need
fulfillment that are harmful to others (Spielman & Staub, in press). When needs are
satisfied, people are more likely to behave in prosocial, responsible, constructive ways
(Staub, 1 997). Psychological security within the organizational context should lead to
more responsible decision making and behavior.
It should be noted that when people feel committed and beholden to an
organization, they may be less likely to oppose decisions or courses of action within
it. This may be particularly so when they have been granted a secure position within
the organization. The granting of security may give the employee a feeling of debt or
loyalty to the organization that squelches the drive to speak against harmdoing. A
feeling of embeddedness in an organization can lead to uncritical loyalty that actually
increases the likelihood of supporting organizational harmdoing (Staub, 1997).
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However, theory presented here more strongly suggests that employment security,
coupled with the other practices outlined here, should contribute positively to
corporate responsibility3
.
Thus, employee ownership, flat hierarchies, democratic decision-making
practices, sharing of information and employment security should address many of the
key mechanisms that facilitate irresponsible and harmful corporate behavior. These
practices should decrease diffusion and abdication of responsibility, increase concern
for a broader range of stakeholders, and increase the strength and frequency of
opposing voices within the firm.
There is a danger that the practices outlined above will create a positive
environment within the firm, such that the corporation treats its people well, and
employees care for each other and behave effectively and responsibly within the
corporation, but still treat external stakeholders poorly. When people feel committed
and beholden to an organization, they may be less likely to oppose decisions or
courses of action. Feeling embedded in an organization can lead to uncritical loyalty
that actually increases the likelihood of supporting organizational harmdoing (Staub,
1997). However, coupling the suggested human resource practices with a social-
economic ideology should generate inclusive caring, that is, caring that includes
internal and external stakeholders. Thus, firms with social-economic ideologies and
3 Human resource researchers have cited other people-centered practices, such as selective
hiring and high levels of training, as useful for improving the profitability of companies.
These were
not relevant to the current theory of responsibility. Employees are not necessarily aware
of the
selectivity of the hiring process. To the extent that they are, selectivity may enhance feelings
in-group
superiority that facilitate negative behavior towards potential targets of corporate
behavior (Locksley,
Oritz, & Hepburn, 1980). High levels of training refers mainly to line workers producing tangible
goods. It is not discussed in general terms across types of organizations
and was not considered
relevant (e.g., MacDuffie & Kochan, 1995).
26
people-centered human resource practices should have managers and employees who
are committed to a “socially responsible” corporate mission and are psychologically
and structurally enabled to pursue that mission.
Hypotheses
In part, the current model proposes psychological mechanisms that influence
corporate responsibility. It then proposes organizational features that, through their
effect on those mechanisms, produce more and less responsible behavior. The present
study measures the association between these organizational features and
responsibility. It does not measure the proposed psychological mechanisms. It
cannot clinch a causal relationship between organizational practices and responsible
corporate behavior. Future research will have to address both of these shortcomings.
The study presented here predicted that firms with both more social-economic
ideologies and more people-centered human resource practices would behave more
responsibly than other corporations. Ideology and human resource practices were
expected to independently predict corporate behavior. It was tentatively hypothesized
that human resource practices might be somewhat less predictive. People-centered
practices are believed to align workers with corporate ideology. Alignment with an
economic ideology may counteract the potential benefits of people-centered practices.
This would reduce a human resource main effect and contribute to an interaction
whereby responsibility increases substantially when people-centered practices
combine with social economic ideology and increases less (or remains level) when
people-centered practices combine with economic ideology.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
The pool of potential participants included the 651 publicly traded U.S.
companies tracked by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Company (KLD) in
SOCRATES-The Corporate Social Ratings Monitor. SOCRATES is a proprietary
database that provides access to social ratings and other data pertaining to the social
records of corporations. It includes all of the Standard and Poors 500 corporations
plus another 150 comparable organizations.
Procedure
Recruitment
A letter and survey were sent to the senior human resource executive at each
of 651 corporations in SOCRATES. The letter briefly explained the project and
asked executives to complete the survey and mail it back in a postage-paid self-
addressed envelope. In exchange for participation, we offered executives the results
of the study, as well as the average survey responses of other participating
corporations from their particular industry.
We assured individuals that the information they provided would never be
connected to them or the corporations for which they work and that corporations
would never be identified as participants in the study.
Three surveys were erroneously sent to corporations not in the KLD data base,
but with names extremely similar to KLD companies. Three companies in the KLD
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database maintain their corporate head quarters in Canada and were excluded from
potential participation (i.e. we did not mail them surveys). Ten surveys came back “
return to sender because the executive to whom they were mailed no longer worked
for the firm or the corporate headquarters had moved. Six hundred thirty eight
invitations to participate in the study were sent to the proper address. Of this 638, 101
executives returned surveys, a 15.8% response rate. One survey came from one of the
three companies that were not in the database and could not be used. Seven
corporations replied to the survey with letters stating that the company had an
absolute policy of not participating in research. Excluding these companies, the
response rate raises to 15.9%.
Independent Measures
Human resource practices . The senior human resource executive at each
participating corporation completed a survey ofhuman resource practices. The
survey contained twelve items, two or three items about each of the following five
practices: 1) employee ownership (items 1 and 2), 2) democratic decision-making
(items 6 and 7), 3) status differences (items 1 1 and 12), 4) employment security (items
8, 9, and 10) and 5) information-sharing (items 3, 4, and 5). Participants responded to
items on scales from 0 to 100. For example, one of the “employee ownership” items
reads, “Your corporation provides stock ownership for . .
.”
Participants responded
on a scale from, 0-top management only to 100-full work force. They marked an “X”
along a line to indicate their answer (see Appendix A).
An undergraduate research assistant measured the markings on the scales to
convert them into numeric data. Data were left in centimeter units for analysis, but
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have been converted into scale-units (from 0 to 100) for presentation. A second
undergraduate assistant re-measured 30% of the surveys, yielding alphas of .99 for
each of the twelve questions. Items 8, 9, and 12 were reverse coded for analysis.
The items for each of the five human resource practices were weighted so that
the five components contributed equally to the survey. Items were then averaged to
create an overall Human Resource score. Higher scores indicate more people-
centered human resource practices. The survey yielded an alpha of .69.
Ideology . Corporate ideology was measured from annual reports. We
obtained 1997 and 1998 annual reports from participating companies through email
and telephone requests to investor relations departments. Two companies provided
no annual reports. One of the two never responded to repeated requests and offered no
explanation. The second was taken over by another company and had no reports to
provide. Three companies provided only one annual report. Two merged and had no
1998 reports to provide. One failed to provide their 1997 report, despite repeated
requests.
While the primary purpose of annual reports is to communicate companies’
financial performance to shareholders, they also contain meaningful information
(implicit and explicit) about companies’ philosophies (Falsey, 1989). Each report
was individually coded on a scale from 0-strongly economic to 3 -strongly social-
economic. Nineteen ninety seven and 1998 scores were averaged to produce one
ideology score (1997 and 1998 scores were substantially correlated, r = .42, p < .001).
When only one annual report was available, the score on the individual report
replaced the two year average.
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The principal researcher developed the coding scheme (see Appendix B) and
piloted it with advanced doctoral students. After the coding scheme was refined such
that doctoral students generated consistent ratings, the principal researcher trained
three undergraduate research assistants. The research assistants coded pilot reports
until they came to produce consistent ratings (alpha = .78). They then progressed to
code annual reports from participating companies. It should be noted that all pilot
coding was done on reports from companies that were not participating in the study.
To maintain independence of ratings, raters coded only one year of any
company’s annual reports. In other words, if Rater A coded Company X’s 1997
report, than Rater B coded Company X’s 1998 report. Nineteen percent of annual
reports were re-coded by a second rater who had not previously seen either of the
company’s reports, producing an alpha of .74.
Dependent Measures
Corporate responsibility was assessed through the yearly KLD ratings of
corporate social behavior (cf. Waddock & Graves, 1997). KLD is an independent
business that rates the social records of corporations for interested business and
investor communities. It’s primary function is the assessment of company social
behavior, not investment management.
KLD evaluates firms in the categories of community, product, ecological
environment, employee relations, diversity, non-U. S. operations and other. Categories
that reflect behaviors of the corporation towards the outside world (i.e. community,
product, environment) served as dependent measures. The non-U. S. operations
category could not be used because of an employee relations component that would
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have been confounded with the independent measure of human resource practices.
KLD also reports firms involvement in certain industries (e.g. gambling, military),
although, these reports do not enter the current research. KLD creates ratings for each
category through an assessment of several classes of strengths and weaknesses. For
example, the community category considers generous and innovative giving, support
for housing and education, and “other strength,” as well as investment controversies,
negative economic impact and “other concern.” The rating scale runs along five steps
from “major concern or weakness” to “major strength.” We converted the ratings into
five-point Likert-type scales from -2-major weakness to +2-major strength (cf.
Waddock & Graves, 1997; see Appendix C for a description of the KLD rating
system). We averaged the scales from 1997 and 1998 to produce single scales for
each rating category. (Correlations between 1997 and 1998 ratings for community,
product and environment categories produced r’s of .77, .91, and .88, respectively; all
p’s < .001). Scores within categories were standardized and the standardized
categories were then averaged into a single “Responsibility” score for analysis. These
Responsibility scores were roughly normally distributed (see Appendix D).
The three categories did not consistently correlate. Environment and product
correlated well with each other, r = .30, p = .001, but neither correlated well with
community, r’s = .03 and -.03, respectively. P’s < 1. However, the composite
measure of responsibility was appropriate for analysis because the composite measure
provides a holistic assessment of companies’ responsibility. This process is
analogous to a situation in which an assessment of someone’s financial worth would
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be best represented by a combination of that person’s stocks, bonds and cash, even
though the three may not correlate with one another.
Data from 1998 was not available for five corporations. Three merged with
other companies and two were simply dropped from the KLD data base. For these
corporations, a 1997 Responsibility score replaced the two year average.
Control Variables
Control variables were collected from the COMPUSTAT data base. The
study controlled for size of corporation (measured by total number of employees),
industry of operation (measured by primary standard industry code, collapsed into
larger groups), and financial success (measured by annual return on equity3 ).
Previous research has established the importance of controlling for company
characteristics in studies of this nature (e.g. Waddock & Graves, 1994). Different
industries of operation provide very different opportunities for responsible and
irresponsible behavior. For example, a relatively good environmental performance in
the mining industry would look like a poor performance in the software industry,
where environmental risk is much lower. Different sized corporations present similar
problems of comparability. As discussed in the introduction, the theory tested here
explicitly looks to explain corporate responsibility above and beyond that explained
by company financial status.
Method of Analysis
Data were analyzed via hierarchical regression techniques. In regression
analysis, researchers recommend centering predictor variables when testing for
interaction effects (e.g. Aiken & West, 1991). This transformation, which reduces the
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correlation between the product term and the component parts of the term, was used
in the present analysis. The regression model included control variables for company
size (number of employees), industry of operation (represented by dummy variables),
and financial success (annual return on equity). It included main effects for corporate
ideology and human resource practices. The model also included a two-way
interaction term, which was computed as the multiplicative product of the main
effects. Control variables were entered in the first step of the regression, main effects
were entered in the second step, and the two-way interaction was entered in the third
step. The composite Responsibility score served as the dependent variable.
Dummy variables represented industry groups. Several industry categories
were collapsed so that all groups contained at least five companies. After collapsing,
12 industry groups remained: 1) the financial services group , including banks, security
brokers and insurance companies, 2) the pharmaceutical/health care group , including
pharmaceutical and health care companies, 3) the computer and electronics group ,
including software companies, the computer and office equipment group, the
computer and data services group and circuit board and semiconductor producers, 4)
the apparel group , including clothing producers, non-rubber footwear producers,
woven fabric producers, and clothing stores, 5) the oil and mining group , including oil
and gas drilling companies and mining companies, 6) the electric and natural gas
utilities group , including electrical services and natural gas services, 7) the
newspaper/periodical group , including newspaper and periodical publisher/printers, 8)
the industrial measurement/engine/equipment group , including industrial
measurement instruments, industrial machinery, engines and turbines, motorcycles
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and parts, and aircraft engines and parts, 9) the food group , including grocery stores,
confectionery products, restaurants and canned, frozen and preserved foods, 1 0) the
courier/transportation group
, including air courier services, air transport services,
transit and passenger train services, 11) the metal group , including the smelting and
refining non-ferrous metals group, the fabricated metal products group, and the steel
work, roll and milling group 12) the polymer material group , including the plastic and
synthetic materials (except glass) group, rubber and plastic footwear group, and the
plastics, resins and elastomers group.
The pharmaceutical/health care group was arbitrarily chosen as the referent for
the other industry groups. Membership in the pharmaceutical/health care group is
represented by all zeros in the 11 dummy variable data columns. That is, membership
in this group is represented as non-membership in the other 1 1 industry groups.
Regression coefficients for the other 1 1 industry groups are relative to the
pharmaceutical/health care mean responsibility score (i.e. positive or negative
coefficients indicate that an industry group’s mean responsibility score is greater or
less than the pharmaceutical/health mean score).
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The model significantly predicted corporate responsibility, F (16, 77) = 2.073,
p = .018, R = .301, SE =.432. At step 1, with only control variables entered, the R2
value was .246. At step 2, with main effects for ideology and human resources
entered, R2 increased to .300 - a significant change in R2
,
F (2, 78) = 3.23, p = .045.
Adding the interaction term in step 3 increased the R2 value slightly, to .301.
Analysis revealed a significant main effect for ideology, ft =
.258, p = .026.
As predicted, social-economic ideology was positively associated with corporate
responsibility (see Figure 1, page 37 and Table 1, page 39). A trend appeared for
human resource practices, ft = .149, p = .166. People-centered human resource
practices were somewhat positively associated with corporate responsibility (see
Figure 2, page 37 and Table 2, page 39). As the small change in R suggests, the
ideology X human resource practice interaction did not approach significance, ft =
.034, p = .743.
A second regression was run, entering the five human resource components as
separate variables in step two of the equation in place of the composite human
resource variable. Results revealed that no single component significantly predicted
corporate behavior. Beta weights for employee ownership, information-sharing,
democratic decision-making, employment security, and reduction of status differences
were .089, .052, -.044, .010, and .140, respectively (all p’s > .24).
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Responsibility
Responsibility
Ideology
Figure 1. Partial regression plot of Responsibility on Ideology
Human Resource Practices
Figure 2. Partial regression plot of Responsibility on Human Resource
Practices
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While the control variables accounted for a substantial portion of the model’s
explained variance, neither size of corporation nor financial success of the company
independently predicted corporate responsibility. In fact, corporate responsibility was
somewhat negatively associated with financial performance, B = -.1 15, p = .321.
Differences between industry groups demonstrate the importance of controlling for
industry in studies of this nature.
Table 1 presents complete results of the regression analysis, including Bs,
SEs, Bs, and p-values for all variables4 . Table 2 presents industries ranked by mean
Responsibility score and Table 3 (page 40) presents industries’ mean Ideology and
Human Resource scores, detailing important industry differences. For example,
industry means for responsibility range from .45 for the industrial measurement,
engine, and equipment group to -.30 for the polymer material group. Table 4 (page
41) presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model. Table 5 (page
4 1 ) presents correlations among responsibility, ideology, human resource practices,
return on equity and employee count (see Appendix E for correlations among these
variables, as well as responsibility components, human resource components and
individual human resource items).
4 When interpreting coefficients for dummy industry categories, one should keep in mind that
the proportion of a dummy category to the full sample size directly influences the size of the correlation
between the dummy category and the dependent variable. All other things remaining equal, as the size
of the dummy category increases, so does the size of the association.
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Table 1. Regression Results
Variable B SE T-ratio
Constant
-.608
.310 -1.93
.057
Employee count
.0004 .001 .034 .33 .744
Return on equity
-.005 .005 -.115 -.99
.321
Financial group
.357 .195 .263 1.83 .071
Computer/Electronics group .506 .195 .361 2.45 .017
Apparel group
.447 .206 .281 2.13 .036
Oil/Mining group
.231 .210 .111 .95 .347
Electric/Natural gas utilities group .380 .244 .198 1.59 .117
Newspaper/Periodicals group .407 .239 .228 1.83 .072
Industrial group .631 .210 .433 3.00 .004
Food group .290 .247 .139 1.17 .245
Courier/Transportation group -.091 .226 -.051 -.40 .690
Metal group -.091 .253 -.043 -.36 .721
Polymers group -.118 .258 -.057 -.46 .647
Ideology .202 .089 .258 2.27 .026
Human resource practices .064 .046 .149 1.40 .166
Ideology X Human resources .018 .055 .034 .33 .743
R2 = .301. F (16. 771 = 2.073, n = 018
Table 2. Industries Ranked by Mean Responsibility Score5
Industry ResetSD) ComtSD) EnvtSD) Pro(SD') N
Industrial group .45(0.46) .46(0.82) .77(0.61) .14(0.71) 11
Computer/electronics group .36(0.39) .18(0.32) .43(0.68) .46(0.80) 14
Electric/natural gas utilities group .33(0.51) .31(0.75) .88(0.99) -.19(0.26) 8
Apparel group .30(0.34) .78(0.87) .17(0.35) -.06(0.17) 9
Newspaper/periodicals group .29(0.30) .14(0.24) .43(0.67) .29(0.49) 7
Financial group .21(0.23) .54(0.60) -.04(0.13) -.07(0.48) 14
Oil/Mining group .20(0.30) .80(0.83) -.01(0.89) -.10(0.22) 5
Food group .13(0.55) .30(0.67) .10(1.25) .00(0.00) 5
Pharmaceutical/medical group -.04(0.61) -.61(0.93) -.44(0.73) -.28(1.30) 9
Metal group -.13(0.69) -.20(0.45) .00(1.23) -.20(0.45) 5
Courier/transportation group -.24(0.53) .07(0.45) -.36(1.18) -.24(0.53) 7
Polymers group -.30(0.27) .60(0.74) -1.00(0.70) -.50(0.50) 5
Grand Mean .17(0.47) .40(0.68) .13(0.86) -.01(0.71) 100
5
In this table, Resp stands for responsibility, Com for community, Env for environment and
Pro for product.
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Table 3. Mean Ideology, Human Resource and Human Resource Component
Scores broken down by Industry6
Industry nxsD'>
Industrial .86
(.78)
Comp/Elec 1.27
(.75)
Elec/Gas .88
(•69)
Apparel 1.28
(.83)
Newspaper 1.64
(.80)
Financial 1.13
(.67)
Oil/Mining 2.00
(.50)
Food 1.20
(1.15)
Pharm/Med 1.94
(.64)
Metal 1.30
(.67)
Courier/Trans 1.21
(.57)
Polymers .80
(.57)
Grand Mean 1.27
(.77)
HR(SD~) OwnrtSDt
61.03 54.77
(13.45) (36.90)
69.95 83.13
(12.25) (20.61)
65.60 72.03
(11.18) (22.48)
52.18 49.38
(15.60) (25.53)
51.57 39.02
(8.94) (21.95)
55.12 68.29
(12.81) (24.35)
55.38 52.25
(15.06) (23.76)
54.53 63.13
(11.51) (23.37)
60.98 62.71
(13.16) (33.15)
77.06 87.00
(6.31) (11.67)
56.58 55.63
(11.93) (15.53)
65.94 84.25
(20.07) (19.95)
60.30 64.91
(14.07) (27.61)
InfotSDl Dem-DISDI
68.52 56.99
(25.41) (22.86)
67.90 59.95
(19.74) (20.90)
83.90 46.64
(13.65) (22.00)
48.43 40.63
(31.04) (23.90)
71.67 43.48
(20.24) (13.14)
61.06 39.00
(25.66) (24.62)
68.17 45.00
(20.17) (22.18)
51.58 39.63
(19.64) (13.97)
60.65 51.94
(25.89) (21.04)
82.67 73.88
(11.81) (15.99)
62.26 47.77
(28.96) (25.59)
73.17 53.88
(32.72) (29.96)
65.87 48.98
(24.48) (23.28)
EmoSectSDl
67.01
StatustSDl
57.84
(14.62) (22.76)
68.59 70.00
(11.75) (19.29)
77.60 47.81
(8.58) (22.35)
62.55 59.93
(12.12) (18.03)
62.50 41.16
(8.03) (15.58)
65.78 41.46
(11.85) (24.66)
68.5 43.00
(14.80) (23.99)
67.67 50.63
(22.01) (21.96)
74.86 54.72
(16.05) (23.91)
80.88 60.88
(8.91) (15.28)
67.14 50.09
(17.59) (22.22)
68.17 50.25
(13.50) (24.21)
68.90 52.84
(13.61 (22.37)
Multicollinearity, or correlation among predictor variables, was tested by
means of variance inflation factors (VIFs; e.g. Fox, 1991). A VLF of 1 indicates that
the model terms are not linearly related. A VIF value greater than 10 indicates that
multicollinearity may inordinately influence variance estimates. The maximum VIF
in the regression model was 2.4, verifying that multicollinearity was not a problem.
A plot of the standardized residuals against the standardized predicted values
demonstrates the linearity and constancy of error variance. A histogram of the
residuals reveals that they are roughly normally distributed (see Appendix D). To the
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extent that residuals do not appear normally distributed, one should keep in mind that
regression analysis is robust when data violate this assumption (Fox, 1991).
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
Resp ID HR ROE Employees
Mean
.17 1.27 67.19 15.06 26,611
SD
.47
.77 13.31 14.27 33,121
Minimum
-1.50
.00 30.83 64.65 4,600
Maximum 1.33 3.00 95.50 71.77 179,450
N 100 99 100 94 99
Table 5. Correlations among Responsibility, Ideology, Human Resource
Practices, Return on Equity, and Employee Count7
Resp ID HR ROE Employees
Resp
ID
HR
ROE
Employees
.13 (.194)
.06 (.567)
-.09 (.393)
.07 (.481)
-.06 (.539)
.141 (.170)
.138 (.176)
.162 (.115)
.107 (.293) .07 (.501)
6
In this table, ID stands for ideology, HR for human resource practices, and Ownr, hifo, Dem-
D, EmpSec, and Status stand for employee ownership, information sharing, democratic decision-
making, employment security, and status differences, respectively.
7
In this table, numbers in parentheses represent p-values of correlations.
41
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Review of Theory
Social psychologists have largely ignored the business corporation. They have
done so despite the relevance of corporate behavior to the world and the relevance of
social psychological theory to corporate behavior. Here, I have attempted to
contribute to the small body of literature that the field has produced. I have detailed a
social-psychologically grounded theory of corporate social responsibility and
presented a study that derived its hypotheses from this theory.
The theory suggests that the corporate condition promotes problem behavior
because : 1 ) corporations pursue infinitely receding goals, primarily profit
maximization and, 2) elements inherent in large organizations, such as those that
detach people from responsibility for their actions, facilitate harmful behavior and
suppress responsible behavior. The interaction of constant profit pressure and
structural facilitation poises corporations to behave in irresponsible and harmful ways.
For example, even conservative estimates place the number of deaths and
serious injuries yearly due to corporate harmdoing far above the numbers due to
conventional crime. Hazardous goods and products kill and permanently disable
thousands every year. Similarly, corporate crimes of capital deprive people of far
more money than conventional economic crimes, such as robbery, burglary, larceny
and auto theft. Violations of environmental regulations also take a tremendous toll
(Poveda, 1994; McMullan, 1992).
42
However, corporations also do good. They provide jobs, wealth and, often,
useful services and products. Many minimize environmental impact, follow trade and
financial regulations and even interact productively and philanthropically with
communities and non-profit organizations.
The theory presented here suggests not only that pressure to meet infinitely
receding goals promotes problem behavior, but that different orientations to goals can
create more or less responsible corporations. Furthermore, it suggests not only that
the structure of large corporations creates trouble, but that different structures and
practices can promote more or less responsibility.
In this view, corporations with economic ideologies (i.e. ideologies that define
the corporation as an economic institution whose responsibility is to produce surplus
profit for shareholders) should behave less responsibly than corporations with social-
economic ideologies (i.e. ideologies that view the corporation as a social as well as an
economic institution, embedded in a larger social context). The theory proposes that
corporations with economic ideologies should not only be more likely to ignore other
concerns in the “amoral” pursuit of profit, but that they should be more likely to shift
from “amoral” profit-maximization to “immoral” violation of external notions of
responsibility.
The theory suggests that economic ideologies exacerbate tendencies produced
by a constant state of pressure. For example, such ideologies restrict ordinary moral
concerns. Companies with these ideologies should be less likely to collect,
synthesize, weight, or interpret as meaningful, information about potential harms and
violations. Such information has to cross a higher threshold before being included in
43
the decision-making equation. Thus, the payoff matrix should shifts towards the
irresponsible. Within the theory, economic ideologies are also perceived to justify
irresponsible behavior by linking it to a higher (market) purpose, to facilitate
employees splitting of the self’ into a private moral self and a corporate self, and to
facilitate the devaluing of potential targets of corporate behavior. Social-economic
ideologies are believed to mitigate these tendencies, providing a countervailing force
at every point.
The model also proposes that structural and procedural elements inherent — or
highly common — in complex organizations poise corporations to behave
irresponsibly. For example, individuals tend not to feel responsible for a company’s
behavior as a whole. In organizational contexts, particularly when carrying out the
instructions of others, people tend not to check their behavior against their internal
standards. People within the organization tend to feel a great psychological distance
from potential targets of corporate behavior (distance tends to be greater the higher
the position in the company). The immediacy of career and business contingencies
exacerbate this distance. Organizations also tend to have difficulty breaking from
committed courses of action and individuals within them tend not to share
information about potential problems.
The theory points to a suite of “people-centered” (Pfeffer, 1998) human
resource practices that should counteract many of these characteristics. When
implemented together, these practices should raise internalization of and commitment
to the corporate mission, raise feelings of responsibility for the behavior and
outcomes of the corporation, mitigate elements of career pressure and fear ofjob loss
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that can enhance the pressure to make or go along with harmful decisions, increase
willingness to gather and share information about potential problems and, enhance the
ability to break from committed courses of action, once they have been identified as
irresponsible. The practices considered here are broad employee ownership,
minimization of status differences among employees, broad implementation of
democratic decision-making, sharing of information among employees, and
employment security. Corporations with stronger people-centered practices should
behave more responsibly toward the outside world, particularly when they couple
these practices with a social-economic ideology.
The study presented here predicted that firms with both more social-economic
ideologies and more people-centered human resource practices would behave more
responsibly than other corporations. Ideology and human resource practices were
expected to independently predict corporate behavior. It was tentatively hypothesized
that human resource practices would appear less predictive. People-centered practices
are believed to align workers with corporate ideology. Alignment with an economic
ideology may counteract the potential benefits of people-centered practices, reducing
a human resource main effect and contributing to an interaction.
Discussion of Results
Results provide some support for the proposed theory. The model
significantly predicted corporate responsibility. Above and beyond control variables,
the effects of social-economic ideology and people-centered human resource practices
accounted for a significant portion of the variance in corporate social behavior.
Although the portion of variance explained by ideology and human resource practices
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was significant, it was a small effect relative to the variance explained by the control
variables. As expected, corporations with stronger social-economic ideologies
behaved more responsibly toward the outside world. People-centered human resource
practices were slightly predictive of positive corporate behavior, but the association
did not reach significance. The interaction of ideology and human resource practices
failed to contribute to the model.
Although the study provides only moderate support for the theory, the results
obtained should be reasonably generalizable among large, for profit firms. It was
possible that, because the response rate ofjust under 16%, selection bias might occur.
However, evidence from the respondents suggests otherwise. The mean responsibility
rating of the 101 participating companies (p = .17, SD = .47) was quite similar to the
mean responsibility rating of 100 companies randomly selected from the 550 non-
participants (p = .11, SD = .35), t (199) = 1.03, p = .30. Consequently, it appears that
the results should be generalizable, at least for large, for profit firms
Ideology
The ideology finding not only supports the proposed theory that companies
with social-economic ideologies should behave more responsibly toward the outside
world than companies with economic ideologies, it also demonstrates some degree of
sincerity in the non-fmancial communications of annual reports. This result is
important, given the risk that the public-relations purpose of annual reports would
wash out any meaning from the ideology coding. Still, one should keep in mind that
the main effect for ideology was not particularly large (fi = .258).
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One might argue that the ideology effect represents a confound between the
predictor and outcome variables. Rather than measuring ideology, we may have
simply correlated what companies said that they did with what they actually did.
However, the coding system clearly distinguished between deeds (e.g. Company X
contributed Y dollars to Z program) and ideals or philosophies (e.g. Company X
believes that business should operate in harmony with the community that surrounds
it). Only the later registered as evidence of social-economic ideology. Thus,
concerns over such a confound should be minimal.
Taking the results at face value, the ideology effect provides proscribed
support for the theory. Given the current research design, the results cannot present
direct evidence for the mechanisms hypothesized to be associated with ideology. For
example, the results cannot tell us if firms with stronger economic ideologies are less
likely to collect, synthesize, weight, or interpret as meaningful, information about
potential harms and violations. We cannot tell to what extent an economic ideology
shifts the corporate payoff matrix towards the irresponsible, facilitates the devaluation
of victims, or justifies irresponsible actions by citing higher market principles. Nor
can we observe an evolution along a continuum of harmful or helpful behavior.
However, we can tentatively claim a small but significant connection between social-
economic ideology and corporate responsibility and build future research from there.
Control Variables
The control variables also connected with corporate behavior. Before entering
main effects for ideology or human resource practices into the regression, number of
employees, return on equity, and industry together accounted for a significant portion
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of the variance in corporate responsibility. Neither number of employees nor return
on equity were independently predictive. Although researchers consider it important
to control for size and financial status of companies, among large firms these
variables do not typically provide a good prediction of responsibility (Clinard &
Yeager, 1980). Even though there was a wide range in the size of companies included
in the study, all of the companies were quite large. Perhaps, among large companies ,
size of company is not a good predictor of corporate behavior. Financial status may
not be a good concurrent predictor of corporate behavior. In other words, companies
must react to their financial status. So, current behavior may best reflect prior
financial status. Perhaps, return on equity from years prior to the measurements of
behavior would have provided better predictors in the analyses.
The correlations found here between responsibility, number of employees, and
return on equity are comparable to those found in previous research using KLD data
to measure corporate behavior (Waddock & Graves, 1997).
Differences between industries demonstrate the importance of controlling for
industry in studies of this nature. Mean responsibility scores ranged from .45 for the
industrial measurement, engine, and equipment group to -.30 for the polymer material
group. Mean ideology scores ranged from 2.00 for the oil and mining group to .80 for
the polymer group and mean human resource scores ranged from 51.57 for the
newspaper and periodical group to 77.06 for the metal group.
It is interesting to note that all except the metal group registered positive
scores on the community component of the composite measure of responsibility
(mean community scores range from -.20 to .80). This may reflect an across the
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board trend of corporations to become positively involved in community through
philanthropic spending and other means. Some argue that corporations increasingly
involve themselves in these activities to buy acceptance for damage they do in other
realms (Himmelstein, 1997). Evidence here supports this notion. Two of the three
highest community scores belong to industries in the bottom half of the responsibility
rankings. These same two industry groups - oil/mining and pharmaceutical/medical -
also produced the two highest ideology scores (ps = 2.00 and 1
.94, respectively). As
mentioned earlier, since annual reports are public relations tools, image concerns can
pollute ideology ratings. Image becomes especially important to destructive
industries and companies, particularly when they are attacked in the media (as both
pharmaceutical/medical and oil companies have been). Along with improving image
and buying acceptance for harms committed, certain types of philanthropic spending
and community involvement increase the power of corporations. At the same time
that this spending helps people and organizations, it makes them dependent on and
indebted to corporations (Himmelstein, 1997). In turn, this power can be used in
irresponsible or responsible ways.
Interestingly, the industrial measurement, equipment, and engine group
received the second lowest ideology score, along with the highest responsibility rating
(p ideology score = .86, SD = .78, and p responsibility score = .45, SD = .46). The
group rates positively in all responsibility categories. (The sub-industries that were
collapsed into this category received consistent responsibility ratings, so the ranking
does not stem from combining one highly responsible industry with two middling
industries.) The high ranking of the industrial group surprised the principal
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researcher, given the seemingly large risk of environmental and product hazards
associated with this group. Five of the six most responsible industry groups produced
positive environment scores. Conversely, four of the six least responsible industry
groups produced negative environment scores. Three of the six most responsible
industry groups received positive product scores; none of the six least responsible
groups produced positive product ratings.
Again demonstrating the need to control for industry, even though ideology
significantly predicted responsibility, the average ideology score for the six most
responsible industries (p = 1.18, SD = .29) is somewhat lower than that of the six
least responsible industries (p = 1.41, SD = .47). To a lesser degree, the same is true
ofhuman resource practices, p = 59.22, SD = 7.52 and p = 61.75, SD = 8.63, for the
most and least responsible industries, respectively. Neither of these differences
approached significance (ps > .35).
Human Resource Practices
Although the effects of ideology and human resource practices significantly
predicted responsibility, the independent effect ofhuman resource practices was not a
stable predictor. Given the results, it may be that the practices recommended by the
theory are not associated with corporate behavior towards the outside world.
Measurement issues may also have caused trouble. It is difficult to assess the human
resource practices of large companies at this level of analysis. Such companies tend
to employ different human resource policies for different occupations within the
organization and for different bases of operation (Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson,
& Strauss, 1996). Perhaps, a more precise method would examine single business
50
units or bases of operation within organizations. Individual components tend to have
more homogeneous practices. Although, such methodology would complicate the
conceptualization and operationalization of ideology and responsibility. Similarly,
focusing on a single industry group might improve the examination of human
resources in several ways, increasing the power of the study, eliminating sources of
heterogeneity found in more aggregated data, and increasing the clarity with which
results due to differences in human resource practices could be interpreted
(Ichniowski, Shaw, & Prennushi, 1997).
Further measurement problems might stem from the source of information. A
single survey completed by the ranking human resource executive at a corporation
might not adequately reflect the human resource situation of a firm and might not
provide reliable data. Executives might understandably be hurried and/or
unmotivated to complete the survey carefully. Multiple respondents within
corporations might provide more accurate information. Objective measures ofhuman
resource practices would clearly produce the most precise data and should be used
whenever possible in future research. Substantial reduction in measurement error
should help clarify the nature of the association between human resource practices
and corporate social responsibility.
Again, given the type of research design used here, even a precise account of
human resource practices (and a strong association of these practices with corporate
behavior) could not provide evidence for the mechanisms hypothesized to be
associated with such practices. For example, we cannot tell to what extent people-
centered practices lead to internalization of the corporate mission, lead to feelings of
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responsibility for the behavior and outcomes of the corporation, or enhance the ability
to break from committed courses of action.
Further broad scale analysis would also be necessary to determine if
responsibility flows from people-centered practices, or if both people-centered
practices and external responsibility flow from social-economic ideology. Although,
it should be noted that a mediational analysis conducted on the small association
found here between human resource practices and responsibility suggested that
ideology did not mediate the relationship.
Interaction
The interaction of ideology and human resource practices failed to contribute
to the model and, in reality, may not exist. Of course, if it is true that the human
resource measurement contained substantial error, this may explain the lack of
interaction. Fox (1991) notes measurement error as one of the primary reasons that
multiple regression analyses fail to find interactions. Again, it is possible that the
effects of ideology and human resource practices simply do not interact. Economic
ideology may not uniquely suppress the effects of people-centered practices and
social-economic ideology may not uniquely enhance their effects.
Future Research and Final Thoughts
Obviously, before conclusions can be drawn, or the theory can be dismissed or
accepted, further research is necessary. The results here provide only weak support
for the theory. If further evidence establishes links between ideology, people-centered
human resource practices and corporate responsibility, then the processes
52
hypothesized to underlie these effects should be studied. It would make sense to
examine individual firms that vary substantially in the responsibility of their behavior.
Ethnographic and internal organizational survey techniques (e.g. Fumham &
Gunter, 1993) seem potentially promising approaches. Such methods would allow
one to investigate in depth and detail the processes believed to flow from ideology
and human resource practices. For example, these techniques could make it possible
to examine how ideology affects the processing of information about potential harm,
the shifting of payoff matrices towards the responsible or irresponsible, the
devaluation of victims, and the justification of irresponsible actions. Similarly,
ethnographic and internal survey techniques could make it possible to study the effect
of people-centered human resource practices on the internalization of the corporate
mission, feelings of responsibility for the behavior and outcomes of the corporation,
and the ability to break from committed courses of action. Case studies based on
existing information might also illuminate certain elements of the theory, such as
evolution along a continuum of destructive or constructive behavior. Multiple
techniques could also be used to assess ideology, such as reviewing company
literature, interviewing top executives and other employees. One could attempt, not
only to assess ideology more richly, but to examine the extent to which employees
across the company know and internalize company ideology.
The success or failure of this particular line of research does not reflect the
importance of underlying issues. Psychologists spend a lot of time attempting to
define, predict and control behavior. For example, a large body of literature describes
and explains youth violence and its potential solutions (e.g. Eron, Gentry, & Schlegel,
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1994). Such work is important and hopefully helps society at large, as well as
specific youth and families. However, to some extent, the field arbitrarily focuses on
particular forms of harmful behavior and arbitrarily defines particular harmful
behaviors as psychological problems. Often, relation to power determines how a
behavior will be defined. To be fair, psychology is not unique in this regard. The
field reflects (as well as helps to shape) the views of society.
Crime, for most individuals, elicits fear of poor, marginalized, violent youth
and men (McMullan, 1992). Crime indices catalogue the number of citizens robbed
and cars stolen but not how often corporations sold defective cars or defrauded the
public through price-fixing (Cullen, Maakestad & Cavender, 1987). Corporate
harmdoing is common, costly, dangerous and deadly. It is committed by an upper
class with “traditional” values and lauded identities.
Even people who recognize corporate behavior as problematic tend not to
view the problem as psychological. People rarely regard such behavior as the result
of psychological processes, deficiencies, biases, socialization and social systems (I
mean to simultaneously apply these terms to individuals within corporations and
corporations as entities). These descriptions may sound odd, but they are as
appropriate to describe the large-scale behavior of wealthy corporate captains and
corporations as the interpersonal harmdoing of violent men and women.
In this work, I attempt to view corporate behavior through a psychological
lens. If the theory is useful, it should be pursued. If not, then other lines of research
should follow. Regardless, I believe the issue is important. Corporations impact the
globe deeply. We all hold a stake in their behavior.
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APPENDIX A
HUMAN RESOURCE SURVEY
To complete the survey, place an “X" along the response scale for each question. We realize that your
answ ers reflect approximations and not exact information. Feel free to skip questions that do not apply to
your organization. Once you are finished, put the survey in the postage-paid return envelope and drop it in
the mail. Thank you again.
1) Your corporation provides stock ownership for
o - 100
Top Management Only Full Work Force
2) Your corporation provides contingent compensation other than stock ownership (e.g. gain
sharing, profit sharing) for
o 100
Top Management Only Full Work Force
3) Your corporation provides financial information on a consistent basis to
o 100
Top Management Only Full Work Force
4) Your corporation provides strategic information (e.g. business strategies) on a consistent
basis
to
o 100
Top Management Only Full Work Force
5) Your corporation provides operational information (e.g. defect rates, labor hour
productivity) on a consistent basis to
100
Top Management Only Full Work Force
6) What percentage of the workforce contributes formal input to decisions made
within vour corporation?
0— 100
Top Management Only ' Full Work Force
7) What percentage of the w orkforce holds at least limited decision-making
pow er within jour
corporation?
100
Top Management Only Full Work Force
8) What is the current employee turnover rate at your corporation?
0 ! 20 : 40
i
60
i
80
i
100
%
' 0/°
9) How does vour corporation's turnover rate compare to similar corporations?
0 100
Far Lower Far Hi §
her
10) How highly does your corporation prioritize the goal of long-term
employment
securirv?
0---- ' 00
Not A Priority A ToP Priont
>'
11) Does your corporation attempt to minimize
status distinctions between workers at different
levels (e.°. do vou have common dining facilities, common
parking spaces).
0 -
100
NoAnempt Strong Attempt
12) How much greater is the highest paid employee’s
compensation than the lowest paid
employee's compensation?
v , 100 or more times greaterNo greater research code
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APPENDIX B
CORPORATE IDEOLOGY CODING SYSTEM
How to Code Annual Renorts
A) Have the coding scheme (the 2nd page of this handout) in front of you.
B) First, examine the inside cover and other lead pages and back inside cover and the last page
before the financial pages for statements of ideology (Vision, Mission, Values, etc).
C) Then, read letter from chair/president closely.
D) Read the rest of the pages up until financial summaries. Ignore financial pages. [But be sure to
look at back cover and very end of report. Often there is important information there.]
You are looking for mention of concerns other than just profit, loss, return, business strategy - that is,
concerns for environment, communities in which companies operate, customers, quality of products,
focus on values, ethics, morality, integrity, employees.
If these sorts of concerns are not mentioned, or hardly mentioned, the report receives a “0.”
Mention of these concerns will bring up their score. In general, the more of them they mention, the
higher the score. But, that’s not the whole deal. The apparent significance of the concerns to the
company is crucial. A report might mention multiple concerns (community, environment, integrity) but
only in a blip or two in the president’s or ceo’s letter, or only in a little box off to the side. Such a
report should still receive a low score.
A fairly extensive/meaningful discussion of a single concern (such as customers/consumers) can bring
up the score if it seems central. Although, not above a 2.
Concerns can be meaningful without being very long if they are believably presented as a
driving/central principle of the company.
**Sections devoted to describing acts of corporate philanthropy (such as charity, foundations,
sponsoring of non-profit groups etc) cannot be used. It is OK to consider it the philosophy behind
the activity, if they discuss it.
**Do not use discussion of the following employee issues as evidence of social-economic ideology: 1)
Employee ownership of stock, or other types of employee ownership. 2) inclusion of employees in
decision-making. 3) sharing corporate information - such as financial info - with employees. 4)
employee turn-over rate, commitment to long-term employment, 5) reduction of status differences
between employees. If reports mention these things, ignore them.
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O-Strongly Economic: Annual reports that receive a “0” will mention nearly exclusively concerns for
profit, loss, returns, marketing, business strategy, etc. They will not mention, or will mention only
briefly and peripherally, concerns for environment, communities, customers, quality of products,
values, ethics, motality, or integrity (It would be almost impossible for a report to receive a zero if it
mentioned many or all of these concerns - the point is that a report can receive a zero even if it
mentions a concern of two - if it is short, weak and peripheral). They may mention values or
philosophies, but these will revolve around business strategies and goals. See XXXX, 1996 for a good
example of a report with mentions of concerns that 1 still gave a “0.”
Example: XXXX 1998 ANNUAL REPORT
Example: XXXX 1996 ANNUAL REPORT
1. Annual reports that receive a “T will have brief clips about concerns other than profit, loss, etc.
However, these will not be particularly strong or extensive statements. They will not typically take
places of prominence in the report. They will probably not be repeated often through the report. If
they repeat, or reappear in different forms, they will seem weak and sound like window dressing. These
reports will not usually mention multiple concerns. Again, if they do, the mention will be weak, not
repeated, not prominent.
Repeated mention of a single concern for “customers” or “consumers,” without mention of other
concerns, should still earn a “1” (because such a concern can be synonymous with profit concern - but
not necessarily). Strong statements such as “we care first for the customer, than the
. . .than the
shareholder,” should be taken seriously. Such statements can indicate a concern for the safety/well-
being etc. of customer - placing it as a necessary condition to pursue profits. In other words, not just
treating the customer well as means of making money, but as a condition to be met before money may
be made. A feeling such as this could bump a report up to a “2,” but it should still have some mention
of other concerns (whether a brief statement of values or something else). However, a single focus
cannot bump it to a three).
Example: XXXX 1997 ANNUAL REPORT
2: Reports that receive a “2” will typically mention multiple concerns other than profit, loss, business
strategy etc. These should be mentioned more than once. There should be some support, repeated
mention. They may mention only a couple of concerns, but these will be mentioned seriously,
repeatedly, strongly. Often they will have a feature such as a list of priorities - we care for employees,
customers, shareholders, in that order. Such features, if repeated, should get at least a “2.” (A single
list or statement like this should still get a “1.”) Reports may even have a strong statement of values or
mission other than “profit.” If they do, only one or two of the values or concerns will receive
support/mention in other places in the report (see XXXX, 1997). If reports have both a strong
statement of values (other than profit/strategy) and support throughout the report, they should receive a
“3.” [see discussion of “3” below.]
Example: XXXX 1997 ANNUAL REPORT
Example: XXXX 1998 ANNUAL REPORT
3-Strongly Social-Economic: Reports receiving a “3” will have strong statements of mission or values
that prioritize concerns other than profit. They will mention multiple concerns. They can mention
profit/business; that’s OK. But, this shouldn’t be first in the list. And, statements about concerns such
as communities, environment, quality, integrity, honesty, ethics, safety, should be prominent. These
statements will rest in important, visible places in the report and will typically be
demonstrated/supported by other statements in the report. Support could be in one section, or laced
throughout. But, there will be support.
(A report may receive a “3” even though it does not present a discrete value statement on its own
page/section. In this case, the report will talk about values, repeated throughout, and may
have a
special feature, such as separate reports available for “responsibility” or
“environment and/or an
impressive, multifaceted section devoted to “corporate responsibility.” see XXXX, 1998).
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APPENDIX C
KLD SOCIAL RATING CRITERIA
1997 KLD Social Rating Criteria
COMMUNITY
STRENGTHS
Generous Giving. The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing
three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to charity, or has otherwise been
notably generous in its giving.
Innovative Giving. The company has a notably innovative giving program that
supports nonprofit organizations particularly those promoting self-sufficiency
among the economically disadvantaged. Companies that permit nontraditional
federated charitable giving drives in the workplace are often noted in this section
as well.
Supportfor Housing. The company is a prominent participant in public, private
partnerships that support housing initiatives for the economically disadvantaged,
e.g., the National Equity Fund or the Enterprise Foundation.
Supportfor Education. The company has either been notably innovative in its
support for primary- or secondary-school education, particularly for those
programs that benefit the economically disadvantaged, or the company has
prominently supported job training programs for youth.
Other Strength.
CONCERNS
Investment Controversies. The company is a financial institution whose local
lending or investment practices have led to controversies, particularly
ones related
to the Community Reinvestment Act.
Negative Economic Impact. The company’s actions have resulted in major
controversies concerning its economic impact on the community. These
controversies can include issues related to plant closings, plant
siting,
"put-or-pay" contracts with trash incinerators, or other company
actions that
adversely affect the quality of life, tax base, or property
values in the community.
Other Concern.
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1997 KLD Social Rating Criteria
ENVIRONMENT
STRENGTHS
Beneficial Products and Services. The company derives substantial revenues
from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or products that
promote the efficient use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with
environmental benefits. (The term “environmental services” does not include
services with questionable environmental effects, such as landfills, incinerators,
waste-to-energy plants, and deep injection wells.)
Pollution Prevention. The company has notably strong pollution prevention
programs including both emissions reductions and toxics-use reduction programs.
Recycling. The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw
materials in its manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the recycling
industry.
Alternative Fuels. The company derives substantial revenues from alternative
fuels. The term “alternative fuels” includes natural gas, wind power, and solar
energy.
Communications. The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles,
publishes a notably substantive environmental report, or has notably effective
internal communications systems in place for environmental best practices.
Other Strength.
CONCERNS
Hazardous Waste. The company's liabilities for hazardous waste sites exceed
S50 million, or the company has recently paid substantial fines or
civil penalties
for waste management violations.
Regulatory Problems. The company has recently paid substantial fines
or civil
.
penalties for violations of air, water, or other environmental
regulations, or it has a
pattern of regulatory controversies under the Clean Air Act,
Clean Water Act or
other major environmental regulations.
© 1997 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc. Page 5
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1997 KLD Social Rating Criteria
ENVIRONMENT (Continued)
Ozone Depleting Chemicals. The company is among the top manufacturers of
ozone depleting chemicals such as HCFCs, methyl chloroform, methylene
chloride, or bromines.
Substantial Emissions. The company’s legal emissions of toxic chemicals (as
defined by and reported to the EPA) into the air and water are among the highest
of the companies followed by KLD.
Agricultural Chemicals. The company is one of the largest U.S. producers of
agricultural chemicals, i.e., pesticides or chemical fertilizers.
Other.
Page 6
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1997 KLD Social Rating Criteria
PRODUCT
STRENGTHS
Quality
.
The company has a well-developed, company-wide quality program, or
it has a quality program recognized as exceptional in U.S. industry.
R&D/Innovation. The company is a leader in its industry for research and
development (R&D), particularly by bringing notably innovative products to
market.
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged. The company has as part of its basic
mission the provision of products or services for the economically disadvantaged.
Other Strength.
CONCERNS
Major Product Safety. The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil
penalties, or is involved in major recent controversies or regulatory actions,
relating to the safety of its products and services. The rating is a major concern() based on the seriousness of the problem.
Product Safety. The company has recently paid fines or civil penalties, or is
involved in recent controversies or regulatory actions, relating to the safety of its
products and services.
Marketing/Contracting Controversy. The company has recently been involved in
major marketing or contracting controversies, or has paid substantial fines or civil
penalties relating to advertising practices, consumer fraud, or government
contracting.
Antitrust. The company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for
antitrust violations such as price fixing, collusion, or predatory pricing.
Other Concern.
C 1997 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc.
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APPENDIX D
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS
Histogram of Responsibility with Normal Curve Superimposed
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Frequency
Histogram of Standardized Responsibility Residuals
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APPENDIX E7
CORRELATIONS AMONG RESPONSIBILITY, IDEOLOGY, HUMAN
RESOURCE PRACTICES, RETURN ON EQUITY, AND NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES
RESP
COM ENV PRO ID HR
OWN
ER INFO
DMA
UNG
IMPS
EC
TAT
US 01 02 03
R£SP r 1.000 .484" .722" 642"
.132 .058 -.010 .041 .022 -.027 138 -115 .071 059
p .000 .000 .000 .194 567 .920 690 .831 .793 .174 .259 .500 564
n 100 100 100 100 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 93 98
COM r .484*’ 1.000 .021 -.127 .118 -.052 .063 .071 -.126 -056 -146 020 029 049
p .000 .832 .210 .248 611 .537 482 .213 .580 .148 846 .780 628
D 100 100 100 100 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 93 98
ENV r .122" 021 1.000 .314" -.014 .083 -.027 090 .046 009 .136 -.126 028 087
p ,000 832 .001 .888 .412 .794 .376 .654 .930 .181 .215 .793 .395
n 100 100 100 100 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 93 98
PRO r .642*’ -.127 .314*" 1.000 .139 .077 -.056 -.087 .122 -.002 .268** -.108 .074 -028
p .000 .210 .001 .171 .451 .585 .391 .230 984 .007 .291 483 787
n 100 100 100 100 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 93 98
ID r .132 .118 -.014 .139 1.000 -.063 -.120 -.101 ,008 012 059 -.266" -.073 -.092
p .194 .248 .888 .171 .539 .240 .322 .935 .904 564 008 492 366
n 98 98 98 98 99 98 98 98 98 98 98 97 92 98
HR. r .058 -.052 083 .077 -.063 1.000 .569" .602** .645*’ 563" .590" .464" .343*’ 543*
p .567 .611 .412 .451 .539 .000 .000 .000 000 .000 .000 001 000
D 99 99 99 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 94 99
OWNER r -.010 .063 -.027 -.056 -.120 .569" 1.000 .054 .174 .122 .084 .654" .611" .121
p .920 .537 .794 .585 .240 .000 .596 .084 .226 .405 .000 .000 .233
99 99 99 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 94 99
INTO r .041 .071 .090 -.087 -.101 .602** .054 1.000 .250* .338" .202* .142 -.069 865*
p .690 .482 .376 .391 .322 .000 .596 .012 .001 .044 .161 .509
.000
n 99 99 99 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 94 99
DMAKING r .022 -.126 .046 .122 .008 .645" .174 .250* 1.000 .244* .241* .210* .016 .248*
p .831 .213 .654 •23Q .935 .000 .084 .012 .014 .016 .037 882
.013
n 99 99 99 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 94 99
EMPSEC r -.027 -056 .009 -.002 .012 .563" .122 .338" .244* 1.000 .299* .072 .214* .243*
p .793 .580 .930 .984 .904 .000 .226 .001 .014
.002 .478 .038 .015
n 99 99 99 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 94 99
STATUS r .138 -.146 .136 .268*' .059 .590** .084 .202" .241* .299** 1.000 .157 .149 .153
p .174 .148 .181 .007 .564 .000 .405
.044 .016 .002 .122 .153 .131
n 99 99 99 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 99
94 99
Q1 r -.115 .020 -.126 -.108 ..266' .464" .654* .142 .210* .072 .157 1.000
.110 .135
p .259 .846 .215 .291 .008 .000 .000
.161 .037 .478 .122 .294 .184
n 98 98 98 98 97 99 99 99 99 99 99
99 93 98
Q2 r .071 .029 .028 .074 -.073 .343- .611* -.069 .016 .214* .149 .110
1.000 .066
p .500 .780 .793 .483 .492 .001 .000
.509 .882 .038 .153 .294 .530
n 93 93 93 93 92 94 94 94 94
94 94 93 94 93
Q3 r .059 .049 .087 -.028 -.092 .543* .121 .865* .248*
.243* .153 .135 .066 1.000
p .564 .628 .395 .787 .366 .000 .233
.000 .013 .015 .131 .184 .530
n 98 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 99
99 99 98 93 99
Q4 r .101 .180 119 -.113 -.033 .492’ .209* .627*
* .212* .310* .139 .202 .002 .561"
p .322 .076 .243 .270 .751 .000
.038 000 .035 .002 .169 .045 .982 .000
/ D 98 98 98 98 97 99 99 99 99
99 99 99 93 98
QS r -.171 -.218* .067 -.169 -.076 .450* • .078 .401*
.466’ ’ .371* .119 .218 -.035 .240*
p .097 .034 .517 .101
.469 .000 .449 .000 .000 .000 .249 .032
.745 019
n 95 95 95 95 94 96 96 96
96 96 96 96 90 95
Q6 r -.022 - 154 .088 .025 -.097 .602* .158
.290* - .847 " .196 .257• .280
"
-.074 .246*
p .829 .132 .391 .809
.346 .000 .120 .004 .000 .053 .010
.005 .481 015
n 97 97 97 97 96 96 98 98
98 98 98 97 92 97
Q7 r .054 -.041 -.014 .156 .069 .464
*
.117 .120 .848" .151 .129 .136
.054 .157
p .597 .690 .887 .123
.501 .000 .246 .234 .000 .134 .201
.181 .603 .121
n 99 99 99 99 98 100 100
100 100 100
_i 10C 95
94 99
' In this appendix, Resp, Com, Env, Pro, ID, HR, Owner, Info,
Dmaking, Empsec, and Status represent
responsibility, community, environment, product, ideology, human
resource practices, employee
ownership, information sharing, democratic decision-making,
and status differences, respect Q
- Q7, and Q10 represent the respective human resource items. Revers8,
9 and 1_ represent the
respective reverse-coded human resource items.
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RESP
COM ENV PRO ID HR
OWN
ER INFO
DMA
RING
EMPS
EC
STAT
US 01 02 03
Q10 r .076 -.074 .144 .071 .084 .462** 072 .234* 260*’ 690- .344*’ 063 .158 187
P .456 .466 .156 .485 .410 000 474 019 .009 .000 000 536 .128 064
n 99 99 99 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 94 99
Ql! r .021 -099 - 034 .173 0S6 .504* 151 .181 248* .159 .754*" 164 .178 148
P .840 .330 .737 088 .403 .000 134 .074 .013 .116 000 .106 088 145
n 98 98 98 98 97 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 93 98
EMPLOYES r .072 .176 .027 -.067 .138 .107 .057 .087 169 .042 -043 .035 .004 .132
P 4S1 .084 .793 .511 .176 .293 .577 .395 097 .681
674 .737 966 .198
n 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 97 92 97
ROE r -0S8 -.082 .090 -.166 .141 .162 .112 .075 .159 071 058 .150 - 172 082
P .393 .425 .384 .105 .170 .115 .278 .465 .122
.490 .577 147 105 430
n 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 95 90
95
REYERS9 r -.079 -.008 -.102 - 037 .040 .270* .044 .133 050 .701* .128 007 126 .037
P .434 936 .314 717 .697 .007 .666 .186 .623 .000
206 .943 .227 .714
n 99 99 99 99 9S 100 100 100 100 100 100 99
94 99
REVERS8 r -.131 -.029 - 115 -.091 -.161 .352* .146 .322* 139 .560* 032 .082 .134
.276*
P .198 .774 .259 .372 .115 .000 148
.001 .169 .000 .751 .425 .201 006
n 98 98 98 98 97 99 99 99 99 99 99
98 93 98
REVERS12 r .208* -.137 .315’ .210* -.018 .387* * -.064 .215* 081 .336*
.783* .013 Oil .113
P .048 .196 .002 .046 .863 .000 .544
040 .445 .001 .000 .900 .919 .285
n 91 91 91 91 91 92 92 92 92 92
92 91 87 92
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04 05 06 07 Oio on
_MPL
3YES
F
IOE
l£VE R
RS9
EVE R
RS8
E\E
ISI2
RESP r
P
n
.101
.322
98
-.171
097
95
-.022
.829
97
.054
.597
99
076
456
99
.021
.840
98
.072
481
98
088
393
96
-079
434
99
131
198
98
208-
1
048
91
COM r
P
D
.ISO
.076
98
-218*
.034
95
-.154
.132
97
• 041
.690
99
- 074
466
99
-099
.330
98
.1*6
0S4
98
082
.425
96
-.008
.936
99
-.029
774
98
137
196
91
ENV r
P
n
.119
.243
98
067
.517
' 95
088
.391
97
-.014
887
99
144
.156
99
-.034
.737
98
.027
.793
98
090
.384
96
-.102
.314
99
-115
.259
98
315-|
002
91
PRO r
P
n
-.113
.270
98
-.169
.101
95
025
809
97
156
.123
99
.071
485
99
.173
088
9S
-067
.511
98
-.166
.105
96
-037
717
99
-091
.372
98
.210-
1
046
91
ID r
P
n
-.033
.751
97
-.076
.469
94
-.097
.346
96
.069
,501
98
.084
410
98
.086
403
97
.138
1*6
98
.141
.170
96
040
697
98
-.161
115
97
-018
863
91
HR r
P
D
.492”
.000
99
.450”
.000
96
602*’
000
98
.464*’
.000
100
.462”
.000
100
.504”
.000
99
.107
.293
9S
162
.115
96
.270”
.007
100
.000
99
387*|
000
92
OWNER r
P
n
.209*
.038
99
078
.449
96
158
.120
98
.117
.246
100
.072
.474
100
.151
.134
99
.057
.577
98
112
278
96
.044
666
100
.146
.148
99
-064
544
92
INFO r
P
n
.627”
.000
99
.401”
.000
96
290"
.004
98
.120
.234
100
.234*
.019
100
.181
.074
99
0S7
.395
98
.075
.465
96
.133
186
100
.322-*
001
99
.215*
040
92
DMAKJNG r
P
n
.212*
.035
99
.466* •
.000
96
.847”
000
98
‘
848”
.000
100
.260"
.009
100
.24 S*
.013
99
.169
.097
98
.159
.122
96
050
623
100
.139
.169
99
081
445
92
EMPSEC r
P
n
.310”
.002
99
.371”
.000
96
.196
.053
98
.151
.134
100
.690*
.000
100
.159
.116
99
042
.681
98
.071
.490
96
.701"
000
100
.560”
.000
99
.336*1
.001
92
STATUS r
P
n
.139
.169
99
.119
.249
96
.257*
.010
98
.129
.201
100
.344*
.000
100
.754-
.000
99
-043
.674
98
.058
.577
96
128
.206
100
.032
.751
99
.783*1
000
92
Q1 r
P
n
.202"
.045
99
.218*
.032
96
.280*
.005
97
136
.181
99
.063
.536
99
.164
.106
98
.035
.737
97
150
.147
95
007
.943
99
.082
.425
98
.013
.900
91
02 f
P
n
.002
.982
93
-.035
.745
90
-.074
.481
92
.054
.603
94
.158
.128
94
.178
.OSS
93
.004
966
92
-.172
.105
90
126
.227
94
.134
.201
93
Oil
.919
87
Q3 r
P
n
.561’
.000
98
* .240*
.019
95
.246*
.015
97
.157
.121
99
.187
064
99
.148
.145
98
,132
198
97
082
.430
95
.037
.714
99
.276*
006
98
• 113 I
.285
92
Q4 r
P
n
1.000
99
.210*
.040
96
185
.070
97
.142
.161
99
127
.209
99
.119
.241
98
071
492
97
.182
.078
95
.174
086
99
|
.365
.000
98
'
.132
.211
91
Q5 t
P
n
.210*
040
96
1.000
96
.562’
.000
94
•
.255*
.012
96
.248
.015
96
-055
.597
95
034
.747
94
128
.225
92
166
105
96
.355
.000
95
” .251*
018
88
Q6 r
P
n
.185
070
97
.562
000
94
1 000
98
.420
.000
98
• 203
045
98
•
.204
.046
97
.184
073
96
186
.073
94
.051
617
98
.088
.393
97
.146 I
171
90
Q7 r
P
n
.142
.161
99
255
012
96
.420
.000
98
•• 1.000
100
.19
.05'
10
.208
.039
93
122
.230
98
.094
36
9
-.025
•77<
10<
.122
•22*
9'
-.6.6 1
663
92 |
67
04 05 96 07 010 Oil
EMPL
OYES ROE
REVE
RS9
REVE
RS8
REVE
RS12
Q10 r
.127 .248* .203*
.191 1.000 .310” -016
-.069
.110 -.012 .270*
P .209 .015 .045 .057 .002 .873 .505 .277 .906 .009
n 99 96 98 100 100 99 98 96 100 99 92
Qll r
.119 -.055 .204* .208* .310” 1 000 007
-Oil -.023 -.081 .175
P .241 .597 .046 .039 .002 .948 .918 821 .430 .097
n 98 95 97 99 99 99 97 95 99 98 91
EMPLOYES r
.071 .034 .184 .122 -.016 .007 1.000 .069 .083 .030 -.224*
P .492 .747 .073 .230 .873 .948 .501 418 .771 .033
D 97 94 96 98 98 97 99 97 98 97 91
ROE r
.182 .128 .186 .094 -.069 -Oil .069 1 000 .185 .072 .123
P .078 .225 .073 .360 .505 .918 .501 .072 487 .250
n 95 92 94 96 96 95 97 97 96 95 89
REVERS9 r
.174 .166 .051 -.029 .110 -.023 0S3 .185 1.000 .376” .246*
P .086 .105 .617 .776 2*7 821 .418 .072 .000 018
n 99 96 98 100 100 99 98 96 100 99 92
REVERS8 r .365*’ .355” .088 .122 -.012 -0S1 .030 .072 .376* 1.000 .108
P .000 .000 .393 .229 .906 .430 .771 .487 .000 .307
n 98 95 97 99 99 98 97 95 99 99 91
REYERS12 r
.132 .251* .146 -.046 .270* .175 -.224* .123 .246* .108 1.000
P .211 .018 .171 .663 .009 .097 .033 .250 .018 .307
n 91 88 90 92 92 91 91 89 92 91 92
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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